Public Finance, Governance, and Cash Transfers in Alleviating Poverty and Inequality in Chile by Claudio Agostini et al.
 
Public Finance, Governance, and Cash Transfers  




1          Philip H. Brown






As the Chilean government seeks to reduce both poverty and inequality through cash transfers to 
poor households, local governments are responsible for both identifying the poor and allocating 
transfers.  Until recently, however, evaluating the effectiveness of local governments in enacting 
these policies has been restricted by data limitations. The paper builds on recent evidence that 
cash transfers had highly variable impacts on poverty and inequality at the county level in 2002. 
In particular, we explore how local public finance and the strength of the governing mandate 
influence the efficiency of cash transfers. With a richly-specified model, we find that public 
spending on goods and services, the fraction of available subsidies claimed by the local 
government, and the share of county land that is zoned for industrial purposes are all correlated 
with considerable reductions in poverty and inequality.  In addition, the strength of the 
governing mandate weakly influences the efficiency of transfers in reducing poverty, but not 
inequality.  These results demonstrate that a better understanding of such institutions can lead to 
more efficient targeting for social programs. 
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1.  Introduction 
Many countries in Latin America have seen dramatic reductions in poverty in recent decades, 
with the headcount ratio falling below 30% in Argentina and Uruguay and below 20% in Chile, 
Costa Rica, and Mexico by 2008 (Table 1).  Chile now exhibits the lowest poverty rates in the 
region at 13.7%.  Income inequality, by contrast, remains high across the entire region, with Gini 
indices for 2006 ranging from 0.43 in Nicaragua to 0.59 in Bolivia.  Despite success in 
combating poverty, Chile’s Gini index of 0.54 remains high, even within this comparison group 
of countries with high income inequalities. 
While Chile’s success in poverty reduction is largely due to the positive effects of 
economic growth, various social programs that consist of targeted transfers, both cash and in-
kind, have also played an important role (Pizzolito 2005; Contreras 1996, 2001).  Although 
transfers provided by the government were initially intended to address poverty, current efforts 
are focused on addressing inequality as well.  Specifically, the government has proposed 
programs to strengthen local governance
1 in general and to increase their efficiency in allocating 
cash transfers for the purposes of reducing poverty and inequality in particular (Presidential 
Address 2008). 
Identifying the characteristics of local governments that make them more or less effective 
in allocating cash transfers for the purposes of reducing poverty and inequality is central to 
meeting these objectives.  Despite the fact that transfers are mainly targeted at the level of 
provinces, survey data with detailed income measures are not representative at this level. 
                                                        
1 Chile is comprised of 13 administrative regions. Each has a formal name and a Roman numeral, the latter more 
commonly used. The numbers are assigned sequentially from north to south, with the exception of Region XIII (the 
Santiago Metropolitan Region), which is located between Regions V and VI. Each region consists of multiple 
provinces, which are further divided into counties. Each county has its own government except Antártica, which is 
governed by Cabo de Hornos County. We focus on the 341 independent counties.  In 2004, four counties were 
divided, bringing the number of counties up to 346.   2
Therefore, the impact of public policy is generally evaluated at the regional level (e.g. Contreras 
and Ruiz-Tagle 1997; Contreras 2001; Pizzolito 2005).  Two exceptions are Agostini and Brown 
(2007a, 2007b), which combine census data with survey data to develop statistically-precise 
estimates of poverty and inequality at the county level using poverty mapping methods (Elbers, 
Lanjouw, and Lanjouw 2003).
2  The authors demonstrate considerable heterogeneity among 
counties in terms of how cash transfers impact poverty and inequality.  Given the current 
government’s objective of reducing poverty and inequality by increasing the resources available 
to local governments, a better understanding of this heterogeneity is thus of great policy 
significance. 
The goal of this paper is to employ the county-level estimates developed by Agostini and 
Brown (2007a, 2007b) to analyze how variation in public finance and the strength of the local 
mayor’s governing mandate impact the effectiveness of cash transfers in reducing poverty and 
inequality at the local level within the context of a rich set of controls.  We find that 
characteristics of the local public finance regime such as spending on goods and services, the 
fraction of water subsidies made available by the regional government claimed by the local 
government, and the share of county land that is zoned for industrial purposes are associated with 
greater reductions in inequality and poverty stemming from cash transfers.  The strength of the 
governing mandate also increases the efficacy of cash transfers in reducing poverty, although this 
effect in not quite significant at conventional levels. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the implementation of 
poverty mapping analysis and the institutional context of cash transfers in Chile; Section 3 
provides an overview of the variables associated with poverty rates and the distribution of 
                                                        
2 Census data are representative by definition, yet they do not include detailed information on income.  Survey data, 
by contrast, do include information on income, but they are not representative below the regional level.   3
income across countries and regions; Section 4 presents the empirical specification and analysis 
which identify the characteristics associated with efficient cash transfers in Chile; and Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2.  Cash Transfers and Local Governments 
Due to limitations inherent in survey data, most studies that examine poverty and inequality do 
so at highly aggregated levels such as countries or states/regions/provinces.  However, newly 
developed methods allow such welfare indicators to be estimated at more disaggregated levels, 
e.g., counties and provinces.  One of the main advantages of considering poverty and inequality 
at disaggregated levels is that it captures heterogeneity across different areas within a country; 
such heterogeneity is a major factor for consideration when it comes to the allocation of public 
resources.  For example, Demombynes et al. (2004) and Elbers et al. (2004) suggest that 
addressing heterogeneity across regions can improve the targeting and impact of resource 
allocation.  
In the absence of survey data that are statically-representative at low levels of 
aggregation, poverty mapping has emerged as a popular tool for estimating poverty and 
inequality at the local level.  Although the data and computational needs for poverty mapping are 
considerable, there are several important advantages to using poverty maps relative to relying on 
aggregate estimates of poverty and inequality in formulating public policy.  First, Baker and 
Grosh (1994) show that poverty maps increase the effectiveness of targeting in allocating 
resources to poverty-stricken areas.  Poverty maps also enhance targeting by focusing on smaller 
geographic areas wherein income variation is likely to be smaller than that at the state, regional, 
or country level (Bigman and Fofack 2000).  Further, Hyman, Larrea, and Farrow (2005) show   4
that poverty mapping may be used to help identify the relative importance of various correlates 
of poverty and inequality.   
The most sophisticated poverty maps combine survey and census data to develop 
statistically-reliable estimates of poverty and inequality at the local level.  For example, Agostini 
and Brown (2007a, 2007b) use the methods described by Elbers et al. (2003) to estimate the 
impact of cash transfers provided by the government on the levels of poverty and inequality in 
Chilean counties.  While the empirical results show that transfers have a significant impact on 
reducing poverty and inequality at the local level, there is tremendous heterogeneity across 
regions, suggesting that measures such as public finance regimes and/or the political will of their 
governments may influence these outcomes (e.g., Simpson 1990; Chong and Caderón 2000; 
Mahler 2002; Brady 2003). 
In particular, local governments play a central role in implementing many social 
programs in Chile.
3  The targeting mechanism in almost all of the programs is the “CAS-2 Card,” 
which gathers data on household demographics, employment and income, the ownership of 
various durable goods and assets, the physical quality of housing, and access to potable water to 
determine eligibility and priority for transfers for poverty relief.
4  Since each household is 
evaluated at the request of its head, poor households that do not request a CAS-2 Card evaluation 
are ineligible to receive transfers.  As the government in each county is responsible for 
promoting and administering the CAS-2 Card, varying degrees of efficiency across localities 
may affect the impact of cash transfers on poverty and inequality at the local level. 
                                                        
3 The role of local governments in allocating social expenditures has increased dramatically since Scarpaci and 
Irrarazaval (1994) observed that virtually all authority for financial decision making rests with the central 
authorities. 
4 Soto and Torche (2004) provide additional details on the CAS-2 Card and the classification of poor households.   5
  To identify the effects of public finance and governance on the efficiency of cash 
transfers, it is important to control for other determinants of poverty and inequality.  The 
literature provides ample evidence that poverty and inequality are strongly influenced by access 
to economic opportunities as exemplified by transportation networks (e.g., Kanbur and Zhang 
2005), levels of education (e.g., Lenski 1966; Nielsen and Anderson 1995; Haimovich, Winkler 
and Gasparini 2006), and the share of county residents that lives in urban areas (e.g., Greenwood 
and Jovanovic 1990; Wratten 1995; von Braun 2007).  Further, infrastructure development may 
play an important role in poverty and inequality more generally (e.g., Gustafsson and Johansson 
1999; Bourguignon and Chakravarty 2003).  Socio-demographic characteristics of the local area 
may also influence local levels of poverty and inequality, including the gender of household 
heads (e.g., Eberharter 2001; Gustafsson, Li, and Sicular 2008) and the share of elderly people in 
the population (e.g., Jones 2007; Gustafsson et al 2008).  Finally, there is an interrelationship 
between poverty and inequality (e.g., Barro 1999; Gustafsson and Johansson 1999; Ravallion 
2005) that may correlate with public finance and governance. 
In this study, we evaluate the extent to which four different measures of local public 
finance and one measure of political governance influence the impact of cash transfers on 
poverty and inequality at the local level using the county-level figures derived by Agostini and 
Brown (2007a, 2007b).  In particular, we consider the effects of current expenditures on goods 
and services (as a share of total current expenditures), the ratio of expenditures to income, the 
share of water subsidies authorized by the regional government and claimed by the county 
government, and the share of county land zoned for industrial purposes as measures of local 
public finance.     6
The fraction of county expenses allocated to running the bureaucracy is perhaps the best 
measure of local public finance as budgetary decisions are generally under the direct control of 
county administrators (Chubb and Moe 1990).  Unfortunately, we cannot include this measure 
directly due to a lack of data reporting in many Chilean counties.  However, given that the bulk 
of current expenditures in Chilean counties are allocated either to good and services or to 
bureaucracy, the fraction allocated to the former essentially serves as a proxy for the latter (or its 
inverse, at least).
5  Therefore, spending on goods and services as a share of total spending 
captures is our first measure to capture the potential complementarity of local public goods and 
cash transfers in reducing poverty.  The second measure is the expenditure/revenue ratio, which 
captures the ability of local governments to finance their own spending; this inverse of this 
measure reflects investment, which may impact future reductions of poverty and inequality.
6  
Our third measure of local public finance is the share of the total number of water subsidies (one 
of five transfer programs intended to alleviate poverty in Chile) authorized by the regional 
government that is claimed by the local government.  This measure captures efficiency in 
identifying poor households for poverty alleviation, and perhaps concern for poverty and 
inequality more generally.  The final measure of local public finance is the share of county land 
that is zoned for industrial purposes.  This variable captures local government efforts to use 
regulatory instruments to generate employment and income by facilitating relocation of 
industrial firms to the county. 
To model the strength of the governing mandate, we interact the share of votes won by 
the local mayor with a dummy that indicates whether he or she belonged to the Concertación de 
                                                        
5 In counties for which both measures are available, the simple correlation is -0.91. 
6 Examples of this include investment in education and in infrastructure.   7
Partidos por la Democracia, a coalition of center-left parties.
7  Every Chilean president elected 
since the end of military rule in 1990 has been a member of the coalition, indicating that mayors 
elected under its banner are likely to have strong mandates.  Moreover, mayors who won by 
greater margins are more likely to enjoy popular support to enact legislation on behalf of their 
constituents, particularly the redistribution of wealth (Acemoglu and Robinson 2002).  Both 
interpretations are consistent with Van Der Rijt’s (2008) notion of altruistic governing coalitions.  
Thus, for inequality, we estimate: 
i j
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Here  i G %   is the percentage change in the Gini index associated with cash transfers in county i, 
PF is the vector of variables describing public finances noted above; G is the measure of the 
strength of the governing mandate described above, C is a vector of controls that describe 
important characteristics of the county and the socio-demographics of the people residing there, 
and R is a vector of interaction terms between regional dummies and the share of county 
residents living in urban areas to capture the impact of unobserved heterogeneity at the regional 
level.
8 
  Because poverty lines differ in rural and urban areas, the determinants of rural and urban 
poverty are estimated in two different equations using a Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
framework: 
                                                        
7 Member parties include the Christian Democrat Party, the Party for Democracy, the Socialist Party, and the Social 
Democrat Radical party.   
8 Ideally, this regression would include a county fixed effect.  In the absence of panel data, however, we use the 
region * urban share interactions instead.   8
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(2) 
Here  i H %   is the percentage change in the headcount ratio in county i as a result of the impact 
of cash transfers.  The Seemingly Unrelated Regression approach allows for errors to be 
correlated across equations, and by estimating the equations jointly, efficiency is improved 
relative to Ordinary Least Squares (Zellner 1962). 
 
3.  Data 
The changes in the county-level Gini indices and headcount ratios used in this study are based on 
2002/2003 estimates reported in Agostini and Brown (2007a, 2007b).
9  Table 4 presents 
descriptive statistics of each of these measures by region.  Nationwide, cash transfers spurred a 
7.7% reduction in county-level Gini indices and a 13.5% reduction in headcount ratios.  Poverty 
reduction was much more dramatic in rural areas than in urban areas.  There is a significant 
degree of heterogeneity across regions, however, confirming the importance of controlling for 
unobservable regional characteristics in our analysis.
10 
  As described in Section 2, the influence of public finance on the efficiency of cash 
transfers in reducing poverty and inequality are measured by current expenditures on goods and 
services (as a share of total current expenditures), the ratio of expenditures to revenues, the share 
of water subsidies authorized by the regional government that was claimed by the county 
government, and the share of county land zoned for industrial purposes.  These data are derived 
                                                        
9 Their estimates are based on applying the method described in Elbers et al. (2003) to the 2002 census and the 2003 
Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica (CASEN). 
10 The standard deviation in the percentage change of Gini indices among regions is 3.5% while that for the 
headcount ratios is 4.7%.  The standard deviation in the percentage change of rural and urban headcount ratios are 
6.1% and 1.7%, respectively.   9
from SINIM, a database of municipal management of the Undersecretary of Regional 
Development and Administration at the Ministry of the Interior.  Since 2001, the system has 
collected data pertaining to administration and finance, health, education, land management, and 
other characteristics of each of Chile’s counties with the twin goals of providing data to facilitate 
the decision-making process and to enhance the management of public institutions.   
The strength of the local government’s political mandate, as measured by the percentage 
of votes won by the mayor interacted with a dummy that indicates whether he or she belongs to a 
party in Chile’s governing coalition, is obtained from the Electoral Service.  The Electoral 
Service is the authority in charge of administering Chile’s electoral system and keeping all 
election records.   
Several county-level characteristics that will serve as control variables, including ease of 
access to the regional capital, the average level of schooling among adults in the county, and the 
share of the county population residing in urban areas, are also drawn from the SINIM.  The 
share of households connected to the public water supply is derived from the census conducted 
by the National Institute of Statistics on April 24, 2002.  The census covered 4,112,838 
households composed of 15,545,921 individuals.  The census is also the source of data for socio-
demographic controls such as the share of households with female heads and the share of elderly 
people in the county population. 
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables identified in the 
preceding paragraphs; complete data are available for 327 counties.  Public expenditures on 
goods and services in the community represent 18% of total expenditures, on average.  These 
expenditures include spending on utilities, maintenance and groundskeeping in public spaces, 
security services, research, training courses, public kindergarten programs, and similar programs.    10
There is considerable variation in this allocation across counties, with one county allocating 48% 
of its expenditures to such items.  Expenditures represent 83% of revenues on average, although 
expenditures exceed revenues in several counties, by margins as high as 20%.  The fraction of 
subsidies claimed is measured by the total number of water subsidies given by the county 
divided by the total number that is authorized (and hence funded) by the regional authorities.  
That is, this measure captures how well counties are able to identify beneficiaries of resources 
that have been allocated to them.  On average, counties allocate 79% of the subsidies authorized 
by the regional governments, although this figure exceeds 95% in many counties.  Areas zoned 
for industrial purposes represent 8% of the total land in the average county, although the high 
standard deviation indicates considerable variation in this measure.  As noted above, the strength 
of the governing mandate is measured by the percentage of votes won by the mayor interacted 
with a dummy that indicates whether he or she belongs to the governing coalition of center-left 
parties.   
Three variables indicate access to economic opportunities – ease of access to the regional 
capital, average education, and urban population.  The first variable is a dummy that takes a 
value of 1 if the capital is accessible via sealed roads year round and 0 otherwise.  Some 82% of 
counties have year-round access to the regional capitals via sealed roads.  The adult population 
averages seven years of education and 61% of the population lives in urban areas.  The share of 
county residents that requested evaluations to determine and prioritize their eligibility for poverty 
alleviation, i.e., those who requested a CAS-2 Card assessment, averaged 52%.  However, no 
households applied in one county while virtually every household applied in several others, 
suggesting that poverty varies widely by county and that the program has not been promoted 
equally across counties.  On average, 76% of households had access to drinking water through   11
public infrastructure.  Finally, 28% of households in the average county are headed by women 
and 9% of the population in the average county was older than 65. 
  
4.  Results   
4.1. Inequality 
Table 4 shows the influence of public finance, the strength of the governing mandate, and county 
and socio-demographic characteristics on county-level reductions in inequality stemming from 
transfers provided by the regional government, as specified in Equation (1).  The first column is 
the basic specification.  The second column adds the headcount ratio of each county before cash 
transfers as an additional regressor to account for the empirical regularity that poverty levels 
influence inequality and vice versa (Barro 1999; Gustafsson and Johansson 1999; Ravallion 
2005).  The third column then adds an additional term to capture the strength of the local 
mayor’s political mandate.  Interaction terms describing the region and the share of the county 
population residing in urban areas are included in all three specifications to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity.  The results of the three specifications are similar, and variation in the 
regressors jointly explains 83% of the variation in the effectiveness of cash transfers in reducing 
inequality at the county level. 
Each of the four measures of public finance influences local inequality.  Specifically, a 1-
percentage point increase in the ratio of government spending on goods and services to total 
spending implies a 2.6% reduction in the county-level Gini index, significant at the 90% 
confidence level in the last specification.  Government efficiency (as measured by the share of 
water subsidies authorized by the regional government claimed by the local government) also 
impacts inequality: a 1-percentage point increase in efficiency reduces the estimated Gini index 
by an additional 2.6%, significant at the 99% confidence level in all three specifications.    12
Similarly, a 1-percentage point increase in the share of land that is zoned for industrial purposes 
is associated with a 1.6% greater reduction in the Gini index, again significant at the 99% 
confidence level.  By contrast, higher expenditure/revenue ratios are associated with smaller 
reductions in inequality, suggesting that poorer counties are less effective in targeting inequality 
via cash transfers.
11 
Although statistics on income at the county-level are unavailable from official sources, 
including county and socio-demographic characteristics such as the ease of access, the average 
education among county residents, the share of residents living in urban areas, the percentage of 
households with public water supply, and the share of households headed by women in the 
model allows us to indirectly control for economic opportunity and the level of economic 
development in each county.
12  We find that good transportation connectivity to the regional 
capital reduces the effectiveness of transfers in combating inequality, perhaps because good 
roads disproportionately facilitate access to high-paying jobs in the regional capital for people 
with their own means of transportation.  Average education in the county also negatively impacts 
the effectiveness of transfers in reducing inequality, suggesting that education inhibits targeting, 
perhaps because more educated people have better access to non-local labor markets.  A higher 
share of the county population residing in urban areas is also associated with lower effectiveness 
in using transfers to combat inequality in the wealthiest regions (i.e., Regions II, V, XII, and 
XIII) but a higher effectiveness in Regions VII, VIII, IX, X, and XI.  Increases in the proportion 
                                                        
11 All of these patterns and results hold when also controlling for the initial level of inequality, suggesting that they 
are rather robust. 
12 Given limited degrees of freedom and the high potential for multicollinearity among some county and socio-
demographic characteristics, it is impractical to include all of controls described in Table 5 in the regressions.  We 
thus restrict the analysis to the subset of controls that maximize the predictive power of the model and to those that 
are interesting from a theoretical perspective.     13
of households with public water access and with female heads are associated with lower 
effectiveness in combating inequality via transfers.
13   
Interestingly, the point estimate on the share of county residents that requested poverty 
assistance from the government (the basic precursor to becoming eligible) is negative as 
anticipated, suggesting that higher eligibility leads to greater reductions in inequality via 
transfers, although this effect is not statistically significant.  Similarly, the poverty rate included 
in Model (2) is correlated with a greater impact of transfers on inequality, although the effect is 
also not statistically significant at conventional levels.  Finally, the strength of the governing 
mandate is correlated with smaller reductions in inequality (Model 3), although the relationship 
is not statistically significant.  Ceteris paribus, this result suggests that politically-powerful 
leaders are no more effective in reducing inequality than those whose parties are outside the 
governing coalition and those who won the election by slim margins. 
 
4.2. Poverty 
As in many countries, Chile’s official poverty line for rural residents is below that for urban 
residents.  Because the nature of poverty and effective targeting practices may differ for these 
two groups, we analyze the determinants of reductions in headcount ratios associated with cash 
transfers separately for rural and urban residents (Equation 2).  As noted above, however, we use 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression techniques to improve the efficiency of the estimates.   
  There are 28 counties in which all residents are classified as being urban and 26 counties 
in which all residents are classified as being rural (Appendix 1).  As such, the number of data 
                                                        
13 To verify the robustness of the results against the omission of county-level income in the regression, Equation (1) 
was re-estimated with average income per capita in each county as estimated by Agostini and Brown (2007a).  The 
results do not change appreciably.   14
points in the poverty analysis falls by approximately 9% relative to the inequality analysis.  
Interaction terms describing the region and the share of the county population residing in urban 
areas are included in all specifications.  The regressors have very high explanatory power for 
cross-sectional data (Table 5): variation in public finance, the strength of the governing mandate, 
and county and socio-demographic characteristics account for between 77% and 80% of the total 
variation in poverty reduction after cash transfers.   
  The influence of public finance on poverty reduction is similar to that for inequality 
reduction.  Specifically, a 1-percentage point increase in the ratio of government spending on 
goods and services to total spending is associated with a 4.3% greater reduction in poverty in 
rural areas (significant at the 95% confidence level) and a 1.3% greater reduction in urban areas 
(significant at the 90% confidence level).  Similarly, a 1-percentage point increase in the share of 
land in the county zoned for industrial purposes leads to a 12.3% larger reduction in poverty in 
rural areas (significant at the 99% confidence level),
14 although the effect is not distinguishable 
from zero in urban areas.  The expenditure/revenue ratio is weakly correlated with smaller 
reductions poverty rates resulting from cash transfers in rural areas, although this effect is not 
statistically significant. 
County and socio-demographic characteristics included in the regression include ease of 
access, the share of county residents living in urban areas, and the share of elderly people in the 
county population.
15  Ease of access is associated with smaller reductions in poverty rates for 
urban residents, suggesting that members of households with better transportation options are 
harder to target, perhaps because they are more mobile.  If targeting strategies differ for urban 
                                                        
14 The magnitude of this effect is driven by the fact that only 1.4% of the area in which rural people live is zoned for 
industrial purposes.  
15 Again, the limited degrees of freedom and the high potential for multicollinearity among some regressors lead us 
to restrict the analysis to those control variables that maximize the predictive power of the model and to those that 
are interesting from a theoretical perspective.     15
and rural residents, then the share of county residents who reside in urban areas may impact the 
overall effectiveness of transfers.  For the rural sample, we find that higher shares of urban 
residency is associated with lower reductions in poverty in Regions I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, XII, 
and XIII.  For the urban sample, we find that higher levels of urban residency leads to improved 
targeting in Regions III, IX, X, XI, and XII.   The share of county residents older than age 65 is 
associated with a higher impact of cash transfers in rural areas (significant at the 99% confidence 
level),
16 but not in urban areas.  Again, the point estimate on the share of county residents that 
requested a CAS-2 Card assessment is negative as anticipated, suggesting that higher eligibility 
leads to greater reductions in poverty, although this effect is not statistically significant. 
  Model (2) includes two additional regressors – inequality and the strength of the 
governing mandate.  The effect of inequality is not statistically significant in either case.  Finally, 
the strength of the governing mandate is correlated with larger reductions in poverty among both 
rural and urban residents, suggesting that members of the coalition of center-left parties and 
those who are elected by a larger share of the popular vote are more concerned with poverty than 
with inequality.  Still, these effects fall shy of statistical significance, suggesting that public 
finance has a larger influence than governance in poverty reduction. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
Economic growth in Chile has led to a dramatic reduction in poverty over the past 20 years.  A 
series of cash transfers from the government to poor households has played a crucial role in 
reducing poverty, but it has had little success in affecting inequality, which remains stubbornly 
high.  Increasingly, the Chilean government has sought to redress both poverty and inequality 
                                                        
16 Again, the magnitude of the point estimate is driven by the relatively low share of elderly people among the rural 
population in most counties.  In entirely rural counties, for example, just under 10% of the county population is 
elderly.    16
through these transfers, and local governments are playing an important part in that effort.  
Specifically, local governments are charged with evaluating households to identify those most in 
need of assistance and allocating transfers accordingly.  Unfortunately, evaluating the 
effectiveness of local governments in enacting these policies has been severely restricted by data 
limitations. 
  Agostini and Brown (2007a, 2007b) combine census and survey data to provide empirical 
evidence that cash transfers reduced both poverty and inequality in 2002.   However, they also 
find a significant degree of heterogeneity across counties in terms of the magnitude of these 
reductions.  To better understand such heterogeneity, this paper analyzes how local public 
finance and the strength of the governing mandate impact reductions in poverty and inequality 
associated with cash transfers.  Identifying these factors will allow policy makers to focus on 
strengthening specific aspects of local administration and public finance to increase the 
effectiveness of these social programs. 
Our findings show that the local public finance regime has a sizable impact on the 
efficiency of transfers.  For example, a 1-percentage point increase in the share of current 
expenditures allocated to goods and services increases reductions in inequality resulting from 
cash transfers by 2.6%, reduces rural inequality by 4.4%, and reduces urban poverty by 1.3%.  A 
1-percentage point increase in the share of subsidies made available by the regional government 
that is claimed by the local government increases the reduction in inequality by about 2.6%.  
Similarly, a 1-percentage point increase in the share of land in the county that is zoned for 
industrial purposes increases the reduction in inequality stemming from transfers by about 1.6% 
and reduces rural poverty by about 1.3%.  By contrast, increases in the expenditure/revenue ratio 
are associated with smaller reductions in inequality from cash transfers and weakly smaller   17
reduction in rural poverty.  These results are robust to a rich series of controls, including county 
and socio-demographic characteristics, initial levels of local poverty and inequality, as well as 
region and urban residence interaction terms.   
The results for the strength of the mayor’s governing mandate are somewhat weaker: this 
measure has no statistical effect on inequality, but it does lead to higher reductions in both rural 
and urban poverty (although the effect is only significant at the 85% confidence level).  This 
result suggests that members of the Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia and those who 
received a larger share of the popular vote emphasize poverty rather than inequality in allocating 
transfers despite increasing pressures from the state to address both. 
Our results show that the impact of cash transfers in reducing poverty and inequality is 
sensitive to the quality of local governments.  Therefore, the effectiveness of government 
transfers could be enhanced not only by increasing the amount transferred, but also by investing 
in good local government management and by encouraging good governance practices.   
 
   18
Appendix 1: Counties that are Entirely Rural or Urban 
Region  100% Rural Counties  Region 100% Urban Counties
I  Camiña   V  Viña del Mar 
I Colochane  XIII  Santiago 
I Huara  XIII  Cerrillos 
I Camarones  XIII  Cerro  Navia 
I General  Lagos  XIII  Conchalí 
II  Sierra Gorda  XIII  El Bosque 
II Ollague  XIII  Estación  Central 
III  Alto del Carmen  XIII  Huechuraba 
IV Paiguano  XIII Independencia 
IV  Río Hurtado  XIII  La Cisterna 
VI Pumanque  XIII  La  Granja 
X Cochamó  XIII  La  Pintana 
X  Curcaco de Vélez  XIII  La Reina 
X Puqueldón  XIII  Las  Condes 
X Palena  XIII  Lo  Espejo 
XI  Lago Verde  XIII  Lo Prado 
XI O'Higgins  XIII  Macul 
XI Tortel  XIII  Ñuñoa 
XI Río  Iláñez  XIII  Pedro Aguirre Cerda 
XII Laguna  Blanca  XIII  Peñalolén 
XII Río  Verde  XIII  Providencia 
XII  San Gregorio  XIII  Quinta Normal 
XII Primavera  XIII Recoleta 
XII Timaukel  XIII  Renca 
XII  Torres del Paine  XIII  San Joaquín 
   XIII  San  Miguel 
   XIII  San  Ramón 
   XIII  Vitacura 
Source:  
SINIM, Undersecretary of Regional Development and Administration, Ministry of the Interior   19
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Argentina 40.302  15,200  23.40%  0.49 
Bolivia   9.248  4,000  60.00%  0.59 
Brazil 190.011  8,800  31.00%  0.57 
Chile 16.285  12,600  13.70%  0.54 
Colombia 44.380  8,600  49.20%  0.54 
Costa Rica  4.196  10,300  16.00%  0.50 
Ecuador 13.928  7,200  38.30%  0.46 
Guatemala 13.002  4,700  56.20%  0.55 
Honduras 7.484  3,100  50.70%  0.54 
Mexico 108.701  10,700  17.60%  0.51 
Nicaragua 5.675  3,100  48.00%  0.43 
Paraguay 6.831  4,500  32.00%  0.57 
Peru 29.181  7,800  44.50%  0.52 
Uruguay 3.478  11,600  27.40%  0.45 
Venezuela 26.415  12,200  37.90%  0.48 
Source: Central Intelligence Agency (2008) 
Notes:
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Table 2: County-Level Changes in Gini Coefficients and Headcount Ratios 
 Variable  N  Mean 
Weighted 
Mean  Std. Dev. Max.  Min. 
National             
  %Gini 341  -7.71%    0.0368 -19.5% -0.3% 
  %HCR 341  -13.53%   0.0583 -40.4% -4.9% 
  %Rural HCR  312  -23.45%   0.0519 -44.7%  -12.6% 
  %Urban HCR   315  -8.17%    0.0162 -12.3% -4.1% 
Region              
  %Gini  10 -6.24%  -5.34%  0.0074  -7.51% -4.89% 
I  %HCR  10 -15.80% -9.67%  0.0519  -23.34% -8.67% 
%Rural HCR  10 -22.61% -22.34%  0.0469  -34.43%  -16.73%
   %Urban HCR   5 -8.21% -8.74%  0.0056 -8.99%  -7.60% 
  %Gini  9 -3.09% -3.12%  0.0020 -3.50%  -2.72% 
II  %HCR  9 -11.82% -6.00%  0.0908 -27.44%  -5.40% 
%Rural HCR  9 -30.28% -28.62%  0.0584 -44.68%  -25.06%
   %Urban HCR   7 -5.61% -5.63%  0.0063 -6.67%  -4.79% 
  %Gini  9 -6.49% -6.30%  0.0050 -7.37%  -5.69% 
III  %HCR  9 -13.26% -10.58%  0.0680 -30.73%  -8.91% 
%Rural HCR  9 -34.56% -33.25%  0.0515 -44.64%  -29.08%
   %Urban HCR   8 -8.70% -8.93%  0.0063 -9.37%  -7.62% 
  %Gini  15 -7.00%  -6.45%  0.0059  -7.99% -5.84% 
IV  %HCR  15 -14.77% -10.94%  0.0505  -24.16% -8.51% 
%Rural HCR  15 -23.09% -22.48%  0.0095  -25.44%  -21.83%
   %Urban HCR   13 -7.33%  -7.63%  0.0056  -8.10% -6.42% 
  %Gini  38 -4.61%  -4.33%  0.0090  -6.55% -2.34% 
V  %HCR  38 -9.36%  -8.26%  0.0196 -13.92%  -7.16% 
%Rural HCR  36 -22.81% -22.83%  0.0176  -29.39%  -20.39%
   %Urban HCR   38 -7.12%  -7.35%  0.0045  -8.17% -6.30% 
  %Gini  33 -7.16%  -6.55%  0.0234 -19.46%  -4.67% 
VI  %HCR  33 -11.87% -9.90%  0.0320  -21.18% -7.15% 
%Rural HCR  33 -19.64% -19.37%  0.0157  -23.19%  -15.97%
   %Urban HCR   32 -6.71%  -6.77%  0.0060  -8.22% -5.47% 
  %Gini  30 -9.25%  -8.68%  0.0099 -11.26%  -7.23% 
VII  %HCR  30 -14.38% -12.12%  0.0306  -18.74% -8.66% 
%Rural HCR  30 -22.00% -21.91%  0.0105  -24.52%  -20.53%
   %Urban HCR   30 -8.35%  -8.35%  0.0075  -9.66% -6.21% 
  %Gini  52 -10.01% -8.82%  0.0178  -12.74% -5.14% 
VIII  %HCR  52 -14.25% -12.50%  0.0304  -21.60% -8.39% 
%Rural HCR  52 -22.25% -22.10%  0.0177  -25.69%  -16.30%
   %Urban HCR   52 -9.23%  -9.87%  0.0099 -11.74%  -6.87% 
  %Gini  31 -12.92% -11.66%  0.0166  -15.46% -9.18% 
IX  %HCR  31 -14.85% -13.28%  0.0231  -18.84%  -10.17%
%Rural HCR  31 -23.26% -22.63%  0.0246  -27.30%  -18.82%
   %Urban HCR   31 -8.50%  -8.89%  0.0055  -9.70% -7.34%   24
 
National  %Gini  42 -11.54% -10.04%  0.0157  -14.44%  -7.34% 
X  %HCR  42 -18.49% -15.58%  0.0427  -29.97%  -9.46% 
%Rural HCR  42 -27.52% -27.73%  0.0207  -33.02%  -21.72% 
   %Urban HCR   38 -10.28% -10.77%  0.0073  -11.70%  -8.60% 
  %Gini  10 -10.54% -9.51%  0.0116  -12.29%  -8.66% 
XI  %HCR  10 -25.59% -16.75%  0.1134  -40.40%  -13.63% 
%Rural HCR  10 -37.32% -37.83%  0.0233  -40.40%  -32.88% 
   %Urban HCR   6 -11.92% -11.64%  0.0037  -12.32%  -11.36% 
  %Gini  10 -1.98%  -2.92%  0.0123  -4.02%  -0.25% 
XII  %HCR  10 -20.04% -10.75%  0.0920  -30.65%  -8.67% 
%Rural HCR  10 -24.90% -20.07%  0.0493  -30.65%  -16.92% 
   %Urban HCR   4 -9.78% -10.23% 0.0160 -11.58%  -7.93% 
  %Gini  52 -2.99%  -2.94%  0.0029  -3.64%  -2.37% 
XIII  %HCR  52 -7.60%  -7.02%  0.0203  -16.33%  -4.86% 
%Rural HCR  25 -14.97% -15.64%  0.0164  -20.16%  -12.55% 
   %Urban HCR   51 -6.83%  -6.86%  0.0148  -11.41%  -4.14% 
Sources:  
County-level changes in Gini Coefficients: Agostini and Brown (2007a) 
County-level changes in Headcount Ratios: Agostini and Brown (2007b) 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables: Total Sample 
 
Variable Explanation  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Public Finance      
G&S / Expenditures
A  Current expenditures on goods and 
services  / current expenditures  18.2% 0.075 
Expenditure/Revenue
A  Current expenditures / current 
revenues  82.9% 0.188 
Fraction of Subsidies 
Claimed
A 
Share of water subsidies authorized 
by the regional government claimed 
by the county government  
78.6% 0.157 
% Industrial Zoning
 A  Share of county land designated for 
industrial purposes   7.8% 0.233 
Governance      
Strength of Governing 
Mandate
B 
% of votes won by the mayor in 
2002 if the mayor belongs to the 
ruling coalition 
18.2% 19.4% 
County and Socio-Demographic Characteristics   
Ease of Access
A  Dummy, =1 if regional capital is 
accessible by sealed roads  0.82 0.39 
Average Education
A  Average years among 15+ group  7.42  1.23 
% Urban Population
A  Share of county population  61.0%  0.303 
% Coverage of CAS-2 Card
A  Share of county residents that 
requested poverty assistance  52.1% 0.220 
% of Households with Public 
Water Supply
 C 
Share of total households in county  76.0% 0.214 
% of Households with a 
Female Head
 C 
Share of total households in county  28.1% 0.052 
% of Elderly in Household
C  Share of county population aged 
65+  8.9% 0.023 
Sources:  
A SINIM, Undersecretary of Regional Development and Administration, Ministry of the Interior 
B Electoral Service 
C 2002 Census of Population and Housing, National Institute of Statistics 
Authors' Calculations 
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Table 4: Changes in Inequality (Ordinary Least Squares) 
 
Dependent Variable: ∆% Gini  (1) (2) (3) 
G&S / Expenditures   -0.0247  -0.0224  -0.0258* 
  (0.0161) (0.0146) (0.0148) 
Expenditure/Revenue  0.0091* 0.008* 0.0107* 
  (0.0048) (0.0046) (0.0059) 
Fraction of Subsidies Claimed  -0.0279***  -0.0257***  -0.0257*** 
  (0.0083) (0.0081) (0.0086) 
% Industrial Zoning  -0.0149***  -0.0159***  -0.0168*** 
  (0.0045) (0.0039) (0.0047) 
Strength of Governing Mandate      0.0059 
     (0.0041) 
Ease of Access  0.0079*** 0.0093*** 0.0089*** 
  (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0029) 
Average Schooling  0.0051***  0.0029  0.0031 
  (0.0017) (0.0026) (0.0031) 
%  Urban  Population  0.0383*** 0.0431*** 0.0431*** 
 (0.012)  (0.0101)  (0.0124) 
% Coverage of CAS-2 Card  -0.0078  -0.0068  -0.0069 
  (0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0052) 
% of Households with a Female Head  0.066*  0.0712**  0.0691** 
  (0.0341) (0.0318) (0.0351) 
% of Households with Public Water Supply  0.0442***  0.0399***  0.0388*** 
  (0.0148) (0.0129) (0.0133) 
HCR Before Transfers    -0.0348  -0.0353 
   (0.0313)  (0.0331) 
Region I x Urban  -0.0291***  -0.0271***  -0.0265*** 
  (0.0071) (0.0083) (0.0088) 
Region II x Urban  -0.0049  -0.0059  -0.0064 
  (0.0086) (0.0061) (0.0099) 
Region III x Urban  -0.0434***  -0.0412***  -0.0418*** 
  (0.0053) (0.0041) (0.0055) 
Region IV x Urban  -0.0339***  -0.0309***  -0.0308*** 
  (0.0061) (0.0058) (0.0056) 
Region V x Urban  -0.0128***  -0.0111***  -0.0118** 
  (0.0044) (0.0033) (0.0048) 
Region VI x Urban  -0.0348***  -0.0358***  -0.0361*** 
  (0.0046) (0.0042) (0.0051) 
Region VII x Urban  -0.0584***  -0.0559***  -0.0573*** 
  (0.0037) (0.0048) (0.0051) 
Region VIII x Urban  -0.0621***  -0.0555***  -0.0552*** 
  (0.0051) (0.0063) (0.0071) 
Region IX x Urban  -.0976***  -0.0929***  -0.0889*** 
  (0.0081) (0.0089) (0.0098) 
Region X x Urban  -0.0687***  -0.0701***  -0.0679*** 
  (0.0048) (0.0058) (0.0053) 
Region XI x Urban  -0.0611***  -0.0614***  -0.0622*** 
  (0.0059) (0.0091) (0.0094) 
Region XII x Urban  0.0079  0.0081  0.0072 
  (0.0131) (0.0129) (0.0146) 
Constant  -0.1489*** -0.1331*** -0.1226*** 
    (0.0114) (0.0258) (0.0259) 
N  327 327 327 
R-Squared  0.8219 0.8221 0.8323 
Wald  Test  (Chi2)  3008 2847 3098 
Prob>chi2  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes:  
Standard errors are in parentheses 
* Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1% level; *** Significant at the 0.1% level   27
Table 5: Changes in Poverty Rates (Seemingly Unrelated Regression) 
 
  Rural Urban 
Dependent Variable : ∆ HC  (1) (2) (1) (2) 
G&S / Expenditures  -0.0436**  -0.0437**  -0.0129*  -0.0123 
 (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.0078)  (0.0079) 
Expenditure/Revenue  0.0090 0.0090 0.0070 0.0070 
  (0.0061) (0.0065) (0.0075) (0.0078) 
Fraction of Subsidies Claimed  0.00040  0.00050  0.00060  0.00060 
  (0.0101) (0.0095) (0.0103) (0.0108) 
% Industrial Zoning  -0.125***  -0.123***  -0.0091  -0.0122 
  (0.0111) (0.0114) (0.0121) (0.0184) 
Strength of Governing Mandate    -0.0053    -0.0027 
   (0.0036)    (0.0018) 
Ease of Access  0.0050  0.0040 0.0061*** 0.0054*** 
  (0.0034) (0.0040) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
% Urban Population  0.0737***  0.0741***  0.0087**  0.0092* 
  (0.0103) (0.0108) (0.0041) (0.0053) 
% Coverage of CAS-2 Card  0.0095***  0.0096***  0.0059  0.0058 
  (0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0081) (0.0078) 
% of Elderly in Household  -0.314***  -0.315**  0.022  0.014 
  (0.103) (0.142) (0.039) (0.043) 
Gini Before Transfers    0.0031    -0.039 
   (0.0775)    (0.0381) 
Region I x Urban  -0.0306*  -0.0308**  -0.0221***  -0.0231*** 
  (0.0163) (0.0149) (0.0049) (0.0051) 
Region II x Urban  -0.002  -0.0047  0.0129***  0.0127*** 
 (0.0082)  (0.008)  (0.0043)  (0.0039) 
Region III x Urban  -0.0400***  -.0397***  -0.2488***  -0.2417*** 
  (0.0082) (0.0074) (0.0046) (0.0041) 
Region IV x Urban  -0.0166*  -0.015  -0.009**  -0.011*** 
  (0.0099) (0.0097) (0.0041) (0.0038) 
Region V x Urban  -0.0168***  -0.0204***  -0.0048  -0.0044 
  (0.0064) (0.0073) (0.0039) (0.0028) 
Region VI x Urban  -0.00063  -0.0025  0.0056*  0.0067** 
  (0.0085) (0.0081) (0.0034) (0.0033) 
Region VII x Urban  -0.0298***  -0.0258**  -0.0258***  -0.0253*** 
  (0.0092) (0.0098) (0.0027) (0.0032) 
Region VIII x Urban  -0.059***  -0.0548***  -0.0372***  -0.0319*** 
  (0.0073) (0.0084) (0.0025) (0.0021) 
Region IX x Urban  -0.0503***  -0.0415***  -0.2396***  -0.2435*** 
  (0.0084) (0.0139) (0.0042) (0.0045) 
Region X x Urban  -0.0727***  -0.068***  -0.0597***  -0.0562*** 
  (0.0094) (0.0106) (0.0041) (0.0047) 
Region XI x Urban  -0.0897***  -0.0824***  -0.0657***  -0.0653*** 
  (0.0117) (0.0144) (0.0066) (0.0068) 
Region XII x Urban  -0.0241  -0.0222  -0.3014***  -0.3111*** 
  (0.0149) (0.0145) (0.0053) (0.0051) 
Constant -0.186  -0.178  -0.0889  -0.0745 
  (0.0121) (0.0382) (0.0047) (0.0158) 
N  299 299 301 301 
R-Squared  0.8015 0.8013 0.7723 0.7731 
Wald Test  1110.19  1111.17  981.53  992.12 
Prob  >Chi2  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes:  
Standard errors are in parentheses.   
The Breush-Pagan test aims to verify whether the covariance matrix of the errors is diagonal. Test results of the SUR model of 
Equation (2) are presented to reject the hypothesis that the mistakes of the equations in the model are not correlated. 
*Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level; *** Significant at the 0.1% level 
 